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                           1. Introduction 
    "Failures of cooperation" is one of the six recurring patterns of weakness in productivity 
performance in the U. S. pointed out by the MIT Commission on Industrial Productivity 
(Dertouzos, et al., 1989). The report discusses a lack of cooperation at various levels-within 
firms, between labor and management, in vertical relationships uch as producer-consumer 
and producer-supplier linkages, and among firms in the same. industry segment. For example, 
the commission ascribes the failure of cooperation within the firm to excessive specialization, 
multiple layers of bureaucracy, and little lateral flow of information. These features are the 
major ingredients of what was once considered (and has still been considered by many) as 
the most effective organizational structure, hierarchy based on extensive division of labor: 
The production process there is divided into many distinct tasks, each of which is made 
sole responsibility of a specialist who is only adept to the performance of that task, and 
coordination among tasks is a specialized job of upper management. The deviation from 
such an organizational structure seems evident, however. In the field of human resource 
  * Earlier versions were presented at the Fourth Conference on Game Theory and Mathe-
matical Economics held at Gotenba, Japan, and seminars at INSEAD and Kyoto University. I 
wish to acknowledge my debt to Bengt Holmstrom and Paul Milgrom whose insightful and 
tractable linear principal-agent model is used throughout he paper for the illustration of my 
arguments. I would also like to thank Jean Tirole for helpful discussion and the Center for 
Economic Policy Research at Stanford University for financial support. 
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imanagement, for example, movement from individualistic workplace to cooperative t am-
based organizations has been repeatedly discussed in the press (e.g., Hoerr, 1989) as well as in 
the academic literature (e.g., Blinder, 1990, Nalbantian, 1988). Furthermore, more extensive, 
corporate reform in American manufacturing (Piore, 1989) and in world automobile industries 
(Roos, et al., 1990) has been witnessed. 
    The purpose of this essay is to ask the following question and to attempt o give some 
empirically testable predictions from incentive viewpoints: Is "cooperation" among some, but 
not all, members ofan organization (e.g., employees) good for the organization as a whole (e.g., 
for the employer)? If yes, then when? Some readers might think that obviously the answer 
would be always yes. It is trivially true to say that cooperation by all the members is desirable 
to the whole organization. Most of the existing theoretical research on organizations has thus 
focused on how cooperation among self-interested members can be attained (for example, 
via reputation). However, it is not obvious to answer whether cooperation by a subset of 
members such as workers in lower tiers of hierarchy is beneficial to top management. In fact, 
the current rend in incentive theory appears to emphasize "competition" as incentive devices. 
For example, consider the typical principal-agent model with moral hazard. Cooperation 
between a principal (an organization designer) and an agent (her subordinate who performs 
certain tasks for her) is the focus of the model: the principal wants the agent o cooperate 
with her. However, when there exist many agents, say two agents, the major theoretical 
result is the optimality of relative performance evaluation: if there exist systematic risks so 
that verifiable noisy performance measures ofthe agents' unobservable actions are positively 
correlated with one another, the optimal (second-best) contract pays each agent contingent 
on his performance r lative to the others.1 If, in addition, higher performance measures 
signal higher efforts,' then under the optimal contract with relative performance evaluation, 
each agent is paid less the higher the performance measure of the other agent is. This is 
because the latter's better performance implies favorable nvironments forthe first agent, and 
hence it should be discounted from his pay. Most readers are probably familiar with a rank-
 1 More precisely
, this is true only if (and, with some additional ssumption, if) an agent's 
performance measure x is not a sufficient s atistics of (x, y) where yis the performance measure 
of the other agent (Holmstrom, 1982, Mookherjee, 1984). 
 2 That is, the performance signals atisfy MLRP (monotone likelihood ratio property). See 
Milgrom (1981). 
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order tournament, which is the extreme form of relative performance evaluation. Rank-order 
tournaments have been extensively discussed by economists and applied to various situations . 
(See, for example, Mookherjee (1988) for a survey.) 
    The typical model from which the optimality of relative performance evaluation is derived 
assumes that there is no production externality among agents. However, it is clear that 
once their interaction in production is permitted , they are only interested, under relative 
performance evaluation, in reducing the probability that the others get good performance 
measures. In fact, Lazear (1989) analyzes such a model under tournament schemes and shows 
that pay compression between the winner and the loser may be preferable in order to reduce 
"sabotage" by the agents. 
   If production processes are significantly interrelated as above, then why not modify the 
contract so that each agent appreciates high performance byother agents, rather than stick to 
relative performance evaluation? A team contract is such an example under which each agent 
is paid contingent on team performance rather than individual performance. And if positive 
production externalities like "help" are desirable from the technological point of view, the 
principal may want to provide the agents with monetary incentives toengage in helping each 
other on some tasks. We may call this sort of cooperation i duced cooperation-cooperation 
induced by a grand contract designed by the principal. However, economists are generally not 
excited about he team-based or any other pay system resulting in induced cooperation because 
of the problem of individual motivation. In order for a self-interested agent o allocate some of 
his efforts for another agent, the principal must assign the former agent o joint responsibility 
for the latter's task: the risk associated with that task is borne by both agents. For example, 
under such a scheme, verifiable output from a machine isaffected by the actions of the workers 
who hold joint responsibility for the output, rather than the action of a worker who is solely 
responsible to that machine under the extensive division of labor with individual-based or 
competitive pay schemes. Then the former egime appears to weaken the connection between 
pay and the effort of each individual agent, and hence is expected to give the agents greater 
incentives to shirk. As another illustrative example, consider two salespersons who are assigned 
to the same territory. Their cooperation may increase the sales and benefit the sales division , 
while encouraging cooperation will make the sales volume of each salesperson less informative 
as a performance measure for his effort. Because of this agency cost, the suggestion by incentive 
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theorists in this example isagain relative performance evaluation (assuming that the common 
territory has significant uncertain factors that affect he performance of both salespersons). 
    Such a motivational or "free-rider" problem in "teams" has been studied by economists 
in the framework of principal-agent problems (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972, and Holmstrom, 
1982). The literature suggests he importance of monitoring by the principal: When the 
principal can only observe aggregate p rformance measures ofthe agents who are risk averse 
and have distastes for work, it is usually valuable for her to utilize individual measures for 
each agent's performance.' Of course, this argument does not directly apply to the situation 
given in the previous paragraph because cooperation there alters signals for individual actions 
under the unambiguous division of labor to signals for joint actions. What changes i not 
the availability of additional signals but the nature of existing signals. Thus, whether the net 
incentive ffect of induced cooperation is in fact negative isnot as clear as one might expect. 
    I show that the principal sometimes wants to induce cooperation among agents, even 
though the free-rider problem exists. The illustrative model used is the one developed by 
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987, 1990b). Their 1990 paper presents a simple model of task 
allocation in which it is never optimal for two agents to be jointly responsible for any task: 
Each task is performed by just one agent, which is an important principle underlying hierarchy. 
With some modifications, I obtain an optimality of induced cooperation: it is optimal for an 
agent o help the other agent, and hence to be jointly responsible for each task despite the 
free-rider problem. The benefit from such induced cooperation is motivational: The first agent 
will reduce his effort on the task when he acquires ome help, while the lower effort is less 
costly to induce when his cost of effort exhibits decreasing returns (e.g., monotonous tasks). 
This can be interpreted as an economic rationale of job enlargement and enrichment. 
   I then examine the relation of the optimality of this induced cooperation with stochastic 
correlation between task-specific performance measures. It is shown that there xists a thresh-
old level of correlation coefficient such that induced cooperation is optimal if and only if the 
correlation coefficient is lower than that level. If the correlation coefficient is higher than the 
threshold level, the benefit from relative performance evaluation (filtering out systematic risks) 
dominates any benefit from induced cooperation, even if uncooperative b havior analyzed by 
Lazear appears and has negative ffects on the principal's welfare. I also conduct comparative 
 3 The precise condition for this to hold is similar to the one in footnote 1. 
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statics exercises, showing that induced cooperation is more likely to be optimal as the agents 
are less risk averse, or the tasks are similar in terms of performance measurability and costs 
of actions. 
    In our discussion so far, an agent "cooperates" with other agents if and only if he is induced 
to do so by the principal through design of an appropriate initial contract, and hence we have 
used the term induced cooperation.' This view may be called the grand contracting approach: 
"All members of the organization are linked by a grand contract, and their interaction is limited 
to procedures specified by this contract." (Tirole, 1988, p. 461). This approach, common, in 
most of the literature on the principal-agent relationship, seems to be extreme: As argued 
by organization theorists for a long time and recently reemphasized byTirole (1986, 1988), 
organization members often behave as a group, maximizing group welfare via some forms of 
side contracting, rather than behave independently as individuals. For example, most of the 
recent reviews of economic theories of organizations by sociologists (Baron, 1988, Granovetter, 
1985, Perrow, 1986) criticize economists' emphasis on formal properties of organizations. They 
argue that informal aspects of organizations uch as work norms and social relations among 
organizational members are no less important. 
   Tirole (1986), motivated by the sociological studies of organizations, considers the other 
polar case of comprehensive contracting, in which it is assumed that all side contracts among 
members are feasible. He assumes that a group of members can costlessly write any side 
contract based on information commonly observable among them. The original analysis of a 
three-tier organization ofprincipal/supervisor/agent by Tirole demonstrates that the possibil-
ity of group behavior at a nexus of information (between the supervisor and the agent in his 
model) reduces the net payoff to the principal because of an opportunity for the supervisor 
and the agent to collude to manipulate their private information. Thus, in his example, the 
principal wishes to prohibit side trades if feasible. For example, she could do this by closing 
the communication channel between her and the supervisor, and by using rigid rules instead. 
   Side trading activities of agents do not necessarily lead to collusion. Some of the recent 
literature on labor and human resource, management argues that the free-rider problem under 
work teams can be resolved via mutual monitoring and peer pressure. For example, Levine 
 4 Agents may enjoy helping others
, without any reward, up to some limit. If this is true, 
then this statement should read, "an agent cooperates beyond that limit if and only if ..." 
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and Tyson (1990, p. 187) writes, "Suppose workers are divided into work groups or teams on 
the basis of the interdependence of their work, pay is based on team output, and the teams 
help organize their work. By working together, team members recognize their mutual interests 
and observe how shirking by one can hurt the group. Shirking or free riding now imposes an 
observable cost directly on all co-workers, so that social sanctions may be rationally applied 
against workers who deviate from the cooperative work norm." That is, the principal may 
benefit by delegating to the agents the arrangement of cooperation among them. We may 
call this sort of cooperation delegated cooperation i contrast o induced cooperation discussed 
before. 
   Based on the recent work by Holmstrom and Milgrom (1990a), Itoh (1990), and Ra-
makrishnan and Thakor (1991), we explain when and how side trading leads to delegated 
cooperation, using the same illustrative model of the principal/two agents relationship with 
moral hazard as above. These papers, as well as Varian (1990), show that the most important 
factor is the agents' monitoring capabilities. When they do not share any private informa-
tion, or in other , words, what they can commonly observe is also observable to the principal, 
delegated cooperation has no value to the principal. On the other hand, when they can mon-
itor each other's actions perfectly, delegated cooperation turns out to be valuable even in the 
case where no agent can affect he other agents' performance measures (via help as in the 
previous discussion). Itoh (1990) shows this in a general Grossman-Hart (1983) type model 
under the assumption that the error terms are independent. Holmstrom and Milgrom show 
in the same model as the one used here that in such a case, there again exists a cut-off level 
of the correlation coefficient between performance signals of two tasks such that the principal 
prefers side trades by the agents to no side trade if and only if the correlation coefficient is 
lower than that level.' Delegated cooperation under perfect mutual monitoring enables the 
principal to obtain appropriate efforts from the agents with less risks imposed on them than 
no cooperation. To do this, however, the principal must make the agents responsible to each 
other's outcomes (as in the case of induced cooperation discussed before) in spite of techno-
logical independence, which feature prevents the use of relative performance evaluation . The 
latter method is more valuable the higher the degree of correlation between the outcomes , and 
hence the result follows. 
 5 A related result is found in Ramakrishnan d Thakor (1991) in a different model. 
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   Itoh (1990) also examines the benefit of delegated cooperation u der production exter-
nalities and team production i  the general model. In this paper, I obtain related, but more 
transparent results from the special linear model. It is shown that the benefit of delegated 
cooperation can be realized if the correlation between the error terms are so small that the 
principal prefers induced cooperation torelative performance evaluation, and if the agents are 
sufficiently homogeneous in their risk attitudes and costs of actions. Thus, when the principal 
wishes to induce cooperation among agents, she would also like to encourage mutual monitor-
ing and coordination ofeffort among them. Furthermore, I provide atheoretical justification 
of the argument by Levine and Tyson (1990) cited above concerning the role of mutual mon-
itoring and sanctioning under team production. In addition, it is shown that under team 
production the principal may not need to hire a supervisor who can observe and report indi-
vidual performance, if the agents ide trade. The problem of the supervisor's "hidden gaming" 
analyzed by Laffont (1990) therefore does not arise under some conditions. 
   There is one important caveat on the analysis of side trading in this paper as well as in 
the literature mentioned above. The benchmark case of no side trade is the standard second-
best solution attained by the optimal incentive contract. That is, it is assumed that the 
principal does not design more complex communication mechanisms for the implementation 
of actions. When actions are not mutually observable among agents, this restriction iswithout 
loss of generality (except for the issues of multiple quilibria s in Ma (1988)). However, when 
actions are observable among them, if agents do not side trade, the principal can attain the 
first-best outcome by an appropriate communication mechanism a la Ma (1988). Thus, some 
readers may argue that the benchmark in this case should be the first-best, and hence side 
trades do not improve the principal's welfare. I exclude this possibility by turning to the 
literature on incomplete contracts (e.g., Grossman and Hart (1986)): It is often reasonable to
assume that the principal cannot write explicit contracts contingent on actions because it is 
hard to specify exactly what the actions are in a contract. On the other hand, since actions 
are mutually observable by agents, they can more easily contract on actions implicitly in their 
side trades. With this perspective, side trades may enlarge the set of feasible contract S.6 
   Note that such communication mechanisms would play no role in the world of side trading 
even if explicit contracts on the agents' reports about their actions were feasible. There, 
 6 I am grateful to Jean Tirole for suggesti
ng this. 
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ionce the communication channels opened, the agents would collude in communication stages. 
Thus, there is no collusion-proof mechanism improving the principal's welfare from delegated 
cooperation with no communication (Itoh, 1990). The principal thus would not attempt o 
centralize the information about he agents' actions, and in this respect, he regime considered 
here is truly delegation. 
   The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 focus on induced cooperation 
and delegated cooperation, respectively, and present the results mentioned above. Section 4 
are concluding remarks. Appendix contains all the proofs. 
                        2. Induced Cooperation 
   In this section, I explain two things: (i) the principal's incentive to induce her agents to 
cooperate on, some tasks, in the sense of productive interaction such as mutual help, when 
there exists a free-rider problem; (ii) a tradeoff between the induced cooperation and relative 
performance evaluation. It is assumed in this section that only the principal designs grand 
contracts and no party engages in side contracting. 
   Illustrative model: I use the following illustrative model of a principal-multiagent problem 
with moral hazard, due to Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987, 1990b). There are two agents 
labeled A and. B. They select, respectively, inputs ("efforts") a and b for production, with 
monetary costs CA(a) and CB(b). The efforts are unobservable to the principal. The agents 
are (strictly) risk averse with preferences r presented by the exponential utility functions with 
the coefficients of absolute risk aversion denoted by rA and rB.7 The principal is risk neutral. 
   Throughout the paper, I assume there are two tasks labeled 1 and 2. Task i yields an 
uncertain payoff xi, which is, unless otherwise noted, publicly observable and hence used as 
a performance measure in contracts the principal offers. The principal's total payoff before 
payments to the agents is thus x1 + x2. Each agent possibly provides inputs to both tasks: 
Let a = (a1, a2) and b = (b1, b2) where ai and bi, the inputs to task i, are real numbers for 
i = 1, 2. They are normalized such that the least costly efforts are zero vector for each agent. 
It is assumed that the payoff rom task i (i = 1, 2) depends on the agents' inputs and an 
exogenous random factor as follows: 
                            xi = Pi (ai, bi) + Ei 
 7 Agent A's utility is thus - exp[-rA(w - CA(a))] where w is his income. 
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where Ei is Normally distributed with mean zero and covariance matrix E. Let o'? > 0 be 
the variance of Ei and p be the correlation coefficient (0 < p < 1). The expected payoff piis 
assumed to be twice differentiable, strictly increasing, and (weakly) concave. 
   The principal designs incentive contracts (a,b; WA , wB) which specify the agents' actions 
and performance-contingent payments o them. It is assumed that payment schemes are linear 
in the performance measures:8 
       WA(x1, x2) = alxl + a2x2 + ao and WB(X1, x2) = /31x1 +,32 x2 + /3o. 
The optimal contract maximizes the certainty equivalent ofthe joint surplus of the three parties 
subject o the participation constraints which guarantee some minimum levels of utility for 
the agents, and the incentive compatibility constraints which ensure that the agents, behaving 
independently, follow the instructions by the principal, and hence their choice forms a Nash 
equilibrium.9 Since the fixed salary components aoand.13o simply play a role of surplus transfer 
among them, 1 can ignore them and focus on the choice of the share parameters a = (a1i a2) 
ands =(, 1,02)• 
   An optimality of joint responsibility: The share parameters are determined to balance 
among risk allocation, effort incentives, and effort allocation. The detailed study of the tradeoff 
among these facets is found in Holmstrom and Milgrom (1990b). Most of their analyses are 
conducted under the assumption that the efforts are perfect substitutes in the agent's costs and 
the payoffs from the tasks.10 The assumption that the costs depend only on the total effort 
implies that an increase in an agent's input to one task, however small, induces reduction 
in his input to the other task. Holmstrom and Milgrom show under this assumption that 
when tasks are "small," in the sense of a continuum of tasks, and the error terms of task-
specific performance measures are independent, it is never optimal to assign both agents to 
joint responsibility of the same task: aibi = 0 and ai/i = 0 for i = 1, 2 should hold. The idea 
is simple. Joint responsibility on a task requires that the principal impose risk from that task 
 8 See Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) for justification of this assumption. The model used 
here is regarded as a reduced form of their dynamic model. 
 9 For example, the certainty equivalent of agent A is written as ao + a1/J1 + a2µ2 
CA (a,, a2) - 2 rAa>a where the last term is the agent's risk premium which is equal to the 
variance of his income. The formal optimization problem is presented in Appendix. 
 10 That is, the cost functions and the expected payoffs are written as CA (a, +a2), CB (b, +b2), 
and µi(ai + bi) for i = 1, 2. 
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on both agents, which duplication is wasteful. The principal can reallocate the agents' efforts 
only to reduce the risk that the agents must bear, by making an agent solely responsible for 
each task. 
   Their result provides an incentive-based rationale of the extensive division of labor which 
is an important feature of hierarchical organizations. In contrast, however, it is more and 
more frequently argued that job enlargement and enrichment through regular job rotation 
among different tasks make worker motivation keep high even though each of the tasks would 
be monotonous and boring. Here I show this statement formally. I assume that there are two 
"big" tasks
, the task-specific performance measures have independent error terms (p = 0), the 
expected payoff from each task depends only on the total input (ui(ai, bi) = pi (ai + bi)), and 
it is strictly increasing and strictly concave. This last assumption implies that an agent, who 
chooses a positive effort on a task, reduces the effort when the other agent increases his effort 
on the same task.11 In addition, throughout the paper, I assume the following: 
                      CA(a) = CA1(a1) + cA2 (a2 ); 
                      CB(b) = CB1(b1) + cB2(b2) 
where each term is twice differentiable, strictly convex, and has the first derivative equal to 
zero at zero effort.12 The cost functions reflect decreasing returns to each activity. What is 
important here is that making an agent work a little bit for a task does not require effort 
away from the other task. This is in contrast to the attention allocation case considered by 
Holmstrom and Milgrom. I adopt this assumption in order to focus 'on effects of an agent's 
effort for a task on the other agent's effort for the same task. Then the following holds. 
PROPOSITION 1. Under the assumptions given above, it is optimal for the principal to make 
the two agents jointly responsible for each of the two tasks. 
   The proposition asserts that when tasks exhibit decreasing returns, joint responsibility 
may be desirable, even though the agents free ride on each other, because it reduces incentive 
costs. To clarify this, consider a situation in which agent B has sole responsibility for task 2. 
 11 For example, agent B's reaction function has the slope the sign of which is equal to that 
of 029'2(a2 + b2)- It is negative by the assumptions if /32 > 0-
 12 These assumptions are much more special than are needed . In particular, the additive 
separability is not essential. See Itoh (1991a) for a general case in which I use a Grossman-Hart 
(1983) type model of the principal/two agents relationship. 
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Suppose that the principal assigns agent A to small responsibility for task 2 by increasing the 
share parameter a2 from zero. Agent A then raises his effort a2 from zero. This process costs 
very small by assumption. The only effect o be examined is how the increase in agent A's 
effort on task 2 affects agent B's effort on the same task. As mentioned above, agent B reduces 
his effort b2 when a2 increases. However, the decrease in b2 has the other effect of reducing 
costs of inducing agent B to select b2 (by making the incentive compatibility constraints less 
tight), which effect dominates the free-rider effect. The principal thus prefers inducing the 
agents to cooperate on each of the tasks , which regime is called induced cooperation. 
   The stark difference between this result and Holmstrom and Milgrom (1990b)'s mainly 
comes from the difference in cost structures as mentioned above. In the example after Propo-
sition 1, if the cost functions depend only on the total efforts, inducing agent A to work on 
task 2 requires a fixed cost of risk-bearing. Unless this fixed cost is sufficiently small , the result 
does not directly apply in such a case.13 
    Induce cooperation and relative performance evaluation: In the result presented above, 
the error terms in the performance measures are assumed to be independent . When there 
exist systematic risks so that the error terms are positively correlated , the principal can filter 
out systematic risks by comparing agents with each other . In particular, when she can prevent 
them from engaging in unproductive interaction, the optimal contract in fact has such a feature 
(e.g., Holmstrom, 1982). To see this point in the model analyzed here, following Holmstrom 
and Milgrom (1990a), suppose µ1(a1, b1) = a1 and ,u2 (a2, b2) = b2. Then the optimal share 
rates for agent A are given by 
              a1 = (1 + rAa2(1 - P2)ca1)-1 and a2 = -a1p1 . (*) 
2 Note that a1 is always positive and a2 is negative with positive correlation (p > 0). This is 
because higher performance measure for task 2 implies more favorable environments for agent 
A, and hence it should be discounted from his pay. Parameter a2 is simply determined to 
minimize the risk premium of agent A given incentives provided by a1 . 
   This method and induced cooperation are clearly incompatible: if interaction between 
the agents is allowed under relative performance evaluation , each agent is only interested in 
 13 See Itoh (1991a) for a formal derivation of this result. 
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reducing the other's performance measure (Lazear, 1989). What determine the principal's 
preferences between the two methods? 
    I examine this comparison under a simplifying assumption of separable technology as 
follows: pi (ai, bi) = ai+bi for i = 1, 2. The share parameters of each agent are then determined 
independently of those of the other agent. Actions ai and bi can be positive or negative: 
Positive efforts are "help" as before and negative efforts are "sabotage" as analyzed by Lazear 
(1989). Both types of actions are assumed tobe costly: cAi(e) and CBi(e) increase as e moves 
away from zero to either direction. For simplicity, c" and cBi are assumed to be constant for 
i = 1, 2. To unify Lazear's analysis of relative performance evaluation with sabotage and my 
analysis of induced cooperation, I first assume that the principal cannot restrict interaction 
between agents. Use of relative performance evaluation then accompanies sabotage. Later I 
consider the case where she can restrict their uncooperative behavior completely. 
    In the following proposition, mAi is defined by mAi = UicAi and is called agent A's 
efficiency-loss measure on task i. It measures the difficulty of providing agent A with incentives 
to be productive on task i due to the moral hazard problem: mAi is higher the more difficult 
to measure the performance at task i is or the more costly it is to induce agent A to increase 
his effort on the task. 
PROPOSITION 2. Suppose mA2 > mAl. Then the following hold for agent A: (a) it is always 
optimal to induce agent A to be productive (a1 > 0) on task 1; (b) it is always optimal to 
induce agent A to be productive (a2 > 0) on task 2 as well if mA2 - mA1 < <rAa1)-1 holds; (c) 
if mA2 - mAI > (rAo1)-1, there xists a threshold evel of the correlation coefficient, denoted 
by p* < 1, such that induced cooperation is optimal (a2 > 0) if and only if p < p*, and relative 
performance evaluation is optimal (a2 < 0) if and only if p > p*. Similar results hold for 
agent B. 
   It has been shown in Proposition 1 that induced cooperation is optimal when there is 
no correlation in performance measures. Proposition 2 says that the optimality of induced 
cooperation continues to hold for any level of the correlation coefficient if two tasks are suffi-
ciently similar in terms of moral hazard measures. When they differ sufficiently with regard 
to the difficulty of providing incentives, the principal prefers agent A to perform both tasks 
only if the correlation coefficient is lower than the cut-off level. If the correlation is higher, 
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the principal only induces agent A to work on the task which is easier to provide incentives 
(task 1 in the proposition), and uses the performance measure of the other task to reduce 
his exposure to risk, even though such a regime introduces his unproductive behavior on the 
latter task. 
    The next proposition presents results from comparative statics exercises on the threshold 
value p*. 
PROPOSITION 3. Suppose mA2 - mA1 > (rAU1)-1. The threshold level of the correlation 
coefficient p*for agent A is decreasing i  (rA, Q2 )c'A2) and increasing in cA1. It is first 
decreasing and then increasing in a'. Similar esults hold for agent B.. 
   The proposition implies that if rewarding agent A by relative performance is optimal for 
some fixed parameters (rA, mA2 ), then it is also optimal for higher values of these parameters. 
Similarly, if inducing agent A to cooperate on both tasks is optimal, then it is also optimal for 
lower values of these parameters. These are intuitive results: Relative performance is more 
valuable the more risk averse the agent is or the more difficult it is to provide incentives towork 
on the less efficient task (task 2). The effect of the efficiency-loss measure ofthe more efficient 
task (task 1) is different. Induced cooperation is more likely to be optimal the more costly it 
is to induce agent A to be productive on task 1, because it is then relatively easier to induce 
him to be productive on task 2. The same effect exists for the variance of the error in the 
task 1 performance measure if it is sufficiently high. There is another effect, however. Higher 
variance implies that it is more difficult to measure the performance on task 1, and hence 
the use of information contained in the task 2 performance measure via relative performance 
evaluation is more valuable. This is the reason for ambiguity in the effect of the noisiness of 
the task 1 measure. 
   I next turn to the case in which the principal can restrict interaction between agents. If 
she wishes to utilize relative performance as incentive schemes, it is obvious that she wants to 
limit the agents' interaction in order to prevent unproductive sabotage. For example, in the 
traditional mass manufacturing factory, high in-process inventories make each operation done 
in isolation. Or two managers who are candidates for promotion could be assigned separately 
to an office in California and an office in Massachusetts. The possibility of the isolation may 
increase relative merits of the competitive incentive schemes. 
                             13
    The basic arguments do not change, however. The optimal share rates of agent A who 
specializes in task 1 under relative performance evaluation have already been given in (*). 
Furthermore, it can be shown that the net payoff to the principal under this scheme is increas-
ing while the net payoff under induced cooperation is decreasing in the correlation coefficient. 
When there is no correlation, induced cooperation is better by Proposition 1. If errors are per-
fectly correlated, relative performance evaluation achieves the first best, and hence is better. 
These arguments result in the next proposition. 
PROPOSITION 4. There exists a cut-off level of the correlation coefficient, denoted by p** < 1, 
such that induced cooperation is optimal for p < p** and relative performance evaluation 
(without sabotage) is optimal for p > p**. Furthermore, p** < p* holds. 
   Note that in the case where the principal can limit interaction between agents, induced 
cooperation cannot be optimal for all values of the correlation coefficient, even if the two tasks 
are similar in the difficulty of inducing the agents to be productive. The comparative statics 
exercises are harder in this case, but it appears that the same results as those in Proposition 
3 will hold.
                     3. Delegated Cooperation 
   One of the recent criticisms about the standard principal-multiagent analyses, which 
include the one in the previous section of the current paper, is that the relationship is charac-
terized by a single grand contract designed by the principal.14 Once the contract is accepted 
by agents, they behave independently of each other. In practice, they sometimes form a coali-
tion and engage in side trades that are not directly controllable to the principal because she 
cannot observe them. Successful side trades cause the agents to behave as a group. Informal 
aspects of organizations, such as work norms and social relations, can be well represented by 
such group behavior. The importance of such informal features to organizational design has 
been emphasized by sociological theorists.15 
   Following Tirole (1986), in this section, I take an alternative approach: it is assumed that 
a group of members can costlessly write any side contract based on information commonly 
 14 See, for example, Tirole (1986, 1988).  15 See, for example, Baron (1988), Granovetter (1985), and Perrow (1986). 
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observable among them. These side contracts cannot be enforced explicitly when they are 
contingent on private information shared among coalitional members. This full-side-contract 
assumption thus can be rephrased as follows: it is assumed that a group of members, when 
forming a coalition, abide by their promises built on their common information, with prob-
ability one. This assumption is clearly extreme. However, it is also extreme to assume that 
promises that are not self-enforcing are respected with probability zero. As a first step, this 
paper adopts the extreme approach which is the other side of the traditional one.16 
    Given the full-side-contract assumption, Tirole (1986) analyzes a three- tier hierarchy of 
principal/supervisor/agent where the agent has private information on his productivity and 
his action, while the supervisor sometimes obtains evidence on the true productivity. He shows 
that although the principal can prevent he agent and the supervisor from forming a coalition 
and concealing the information on productivity by designing a coalition-free initial contract, 
the mere possibility of private trades reduces her net payoff rom the one under no side trade: 
side trades lead to collusion. The principal thus wants to prevent them from side trading, 
if possible. For example, bureaucratic rules may be used instead of reliance on supervisory 
information. 
    Analyzing principal-multiagent relationships with moral hazard, Holmstrom and Milgrom 
(1990a), Itoh (1990), and Ramakrishnan d Thakor (1991) recently identify the case in which 
side trades increase the net payoff to the principal-the case where one may call side trading 
activities of the agents cooperation. I first summarize some of the major results from these 
papers as follows: 
PROPOSITION 5. When the agents cannot observe their actions (a, b) each other (and hence 
they can observe public information (x1, x2) only, the principal is never better off with side 
trades by the agents than the case of no side trade. 
PROPOSITION 6. Suppose that production is technologically independent and the agents can 
monitor each other's efforts perfectly. Then there xists a positive threshold level of the corre-
lation coefficient, denoted by p > 0, such that he principal is better off with side trades by the 
 16 Alternatively, one could develop arepeated-game odel of the principal-multiagent re-
lationship to analyze side trades. A successful development of such a model would make it 
possible to analyze intermediate cases of promises followed with probability between zero and 
one. The costs of that approach are that they tend to be complex and messy, and we may not 
go very far with it. As a first step, the easier approach istaken in this paper. 
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agents than the case of no side trade where relative performance valuation is instead used, if 
and only if p < p. 
    If the agents can only observe the payoffs from their tasks, they will select their actions 
independently of each other, as in the previous case of no side trade. Then the only role of 
side contracting is that of mutual insurance. After accepting an initial contract offered by 
the principal, they will attain the optimal risk sharing between them via side contracting. 
They therefore select their efforts not based on their pay specified by the initial contract, but 
based on their final income after side trades. This distorts their effort choice.. The principal 
can prevent them from engaging in reinsurance, without loss of profit, by incorporating this 
possibility into the initial contract. Because of the additional constraints, however, such 
reinsurance opportunities are never of value to the principal." 
    The agents thus must share information not observable to the principal, in order for 
their side trades to be valuable to her. In the paper I consider the case where the agents 
can monitor each other's actions perfectly and write side contracts contingent on them. It 
is assumed that the agents select a Pareto optimal effort pair via side contracting. If such 
side contracting results in higher net payoff to the principal than the case of no side trade, 
I say that delegated cooperation is attained: The arrangement of cooperation is delegated to 
the agents who monitor each other's actions and enforce coordinated actions. Proposition 6 
shows that in contrast to induced cooperation, the principal can enjoy delegated cooperation 
despite technological independence between the agents, if the correlation in the error terms is 
sufficiently small. Production is said to be technologically independent if µ1 depends on a1 
only and t12 depends on b2 only. 
   To understand the benefit of side trades contingent on actions, suppose that the er-
ror terms are stochastically independent. Then without side trade, the optimal contract is 
individual-based, that is, a2 = 0 and 131 = 0 (e.g., Holmstrom, 1982). With side trades, 
the agents choose their efforts to maximize the sum of the certainty equivalents of their ex-
pected utilities.18 Note that under individual-based schemes, the agents elect he same fforts 
whether or not they side trade. Thus, side trades are of no value under individual-based pay. 
 17 This observation is also found in Varian (1990). He points out that mutual insurance 
among agents may be beneficial to the principal if they share information about states of 
nature that are not available to the principal. 
 1s Transferable utility exists in the model. 
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Now suppose that (al, 02) are the optimal share rates when the agents do not side contract, 
and define new rates by 
               a1 = rB a1, a2 = rB -02, 01 = rA -a,, and 02 rA 02 
                       r r r r 
where r = rA + rB. Then under the new share rates, the agents select the same actions 
as those under (al , j32 ), while the risk premiums are minimized. In summary, side trades 
between the agents who observe ach other's actions are beneficial to the principal because 
she can implement the same efforts with less risk imposed on them. Note that this results 
from the perfect monitoring capabilities of the agents, not from the opportunities ofmutual 
insurance. 
   The argument just presented clearly shows that each share parameter must be strictly 
positive under delegated cooperation. We thus face the same incompatibility of delegated 
cooperation with relative performance evaluation as that of induced cooperation discussed in
the previous section: Under side trading behavior, elative performance evaluation is infeasible. 
The relative merits of delegated cooperation depends on the correlation coefficient in the way 
similar to Proposition 4. 
   Induced cooperation and delegated cooperation: We now return to the initial model in 
which the agents can perform two tasks and task-specific performance measures are available. 
Can the principal attain delegated cooperation when induced cooperation is optimal under no 
side trade? To examine this question, suppose that the correlation coefficient is sufficiently 
small that when no side trade occurs, under the optimal contracts, the principal induces both 
agents to perform each of the two tasks. That is, I assume p < p* if the principal cannot 
prevent sabotage under relative performance evaluation, or p < p** if she can do so. In 
addition, suppose for simplicity that for i = 1, 2, pi (ai + bi) = ai + bi, and cAi and c'B.i are 
constant, as in Proposition 2. 
PROPOSITION 7. Under the assumptions given above, the principal attains delegated coopera-
tion if two agents are sufficiently homogeneous, in the sense that for each i, JrAC' -• rBCBi f
is sufficiently small. 
   The proof of the proposition goes as follows. First, suppose rACAi = TBc'Bi for i = 1, 2. 
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Then under no side trade, the optimal second-best efforts for the principal satisfy 
                     c`Ai(ai) = cBi(bi) for i = 1,2. (#) 
This implies that inputs into task i, (ai, bi), minimize the total costs of actions given the total 
effort ai + bi fixed. The principal can implement these efforts with less costs when the agents 
side trade, and hence delegated cooperation follows in this case. 
    However, it can be shown that the set of feasible efforts the principal can implement under 
side contracting by the agents contains only those satisfying (#): the principal has less control 
over the agents' allocation of efforts between them at each task than under no side trade. This 
problem costs the principal nothing when the agents are homogeneous because it is in fact the 
efforts atisfying (#) that the principal would like to implement in the case of no side trade. 
However, it turns out that the case of homogeneous agents is special: the optimal second-best 
efforts under no side trade never satisfy (#) unless rAC'Ai = rBC'Bi holds for i = 1, 2. Of 
course, this does not imply that delegated cooperation is an exceptional case. What is shown 
is that the principal usually implements different efforts under these two regimes. And she 
still attains delegated cooperation if the agents are sufficiently homogeneous.19 
    In summary, if the systematic risk is not important so that the principal prefers induced 
cooperation torelative performance evaluation, she would also like to encourage the agents to 
monitor each other's efforts and to coordinate hem, attaining delegated cooperation. 
    Team production and hidden gaming: The result similar to Proposition 7also holds under 
team production, in which the payoffs from individual tasks (x1i x2) are not observable tothe 
principal while the total payoff x = x1 +X2 is publicly observable. This implies that the share 
parameters must satisfy a1 = a2 and t1 = 02, and hence relative performance evaluation 
is infeasible. Delegated cooperation is therefore attained when the agents are sufficiently 
homogeneous, for all levels of the correlation coefficient. 
   When team production isinevitable because ofthe nature of tasks or production systems, 
the principal generally suffers from the agents' incentives toshirk because of weak tie between 
performance measures and individual efforts (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Holmstrom, 1982). 
 19 This result also depends on the assumption that each agent is perfectly multi-skilled in 
the sense that his productivity at task 1 is equal to that at task 2. Otherwise, the optimal 
second-best efforts for homogeneous agents who do not side trade may not satisfy (#). 
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As is cited in Section 1, Levine and Tyson (1990), identifying team production as one of 
the most important features in employee participation arrangements , suggest that mutual 
monitoring and sanctioning among agents resolve the motivational problem . My analysis 
verifies their assertion if workers are sufficiently homogeneous. 
    Now suppose that the principal can hire a supervisor who can observe individual perfor-
mances x1 and x2 and report to the principal. If the supervisor were benevolent, in the sense 
that he does not need to be motivated to provide truthfully his information , his information 
is valuable, and the optimal schemes (under no side trade) depend on individual performance. 
Laffont (1990) shows that if with sufficiently high probability, the supervisor can abuse his 
position so as to benefit himself at the expense of the agents,20 the optimal schemes do not 
use individual performance. 
   This "hidden gaming" problem is mitigated if the agents side trade. Suppose that the 
production is technologically independent, the agents are homogeneous (rAc'Ai = rBcBi for 
i = 1, 2), and the error terms are stochastically independent .21 Then one can show the 
following: 
PROPOSITION 8. Under the assumptions given above, individual performance measures are of 
no value to the principal when the agents ide trade. 
   To see the reason, suppose that the supervisor is benevolent so that the principal can 
design pay schemes contingent on individual performance. However, when the agents side 
trade, the optimal schemes atisfy a1 = a2 and 01 = 02. That is, they are only contingent on 
the team performance x1 + x2. The result thus follows. 
   Proposition 8 implies that if the agents monitor and coordinate ach other's effort, the 
principal does not need the supervisor, whether he is benevolent or not, and hence the hidden 
gaming problem does not arise, at least under the restricted assumptions made here. Dele-
gated cooperation is sometimes quite powerful and dominates the collusion problems based on 
manipulation of information by supervisors.
 20 The supervisor can form a coalition with one of the agents at the expense of the other
, 
or he can extract private benefits from each agent by threatening to favor the other .  21 These are the assumptions made in Laffont (1990). 
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I                       4. Concluding Remarks 
   Using the linear principal-multiagent model with moral hazard developed by Holmstrom 
and Milgrom (1987, 1990b), I have argued that "cooperation" of a subset of organizational 
members can be beneficial to the organization as a whole. In two kinds of cooperation defined 
in the paper, induced cooperation and delegated cooperation, the main conclusion is very 
similar: they are preferred if and only if the correlation of error terms is sufficiently low. I 
have also obtained other testable predictions: (i) Induced cooperation is more likely to be 
preferred to relative performance evaluation as agents are less risk averse or the difference in 
the difficulty of providing incentives (in terms of performance measures and costs of actions) is 
smaller among tasks; (ii) When agents are jointly responsible for tasks (induced cooperation), 
whether or not team production prevails, delegated cooperation is more likely to be attained 
as the agents are more homogeneous in terms of their risk attitudes and cost structure. 
   The results of the paper offer an incentive-based explanation of the recent trends in 
organization structures, from hierarchy based on extensive division of labor to team-based 
organization.22 Piore (1989) finds that one of the recent organizational reforms in American 
manufacturing is associated with the movement o reduce, and ultimately eliminate in-process 
inventory. The movement was partly motivated by the success of the Japanese just-in-time 
system, which began as an effort to adapt quickly and flexibly to changes in market demands 
for diverse products. The detailed discussion on the comparison of the Japanese production 
system with the American mass manufacturing system, from the technological viewpoint, is 
found in Aoki (1988, chapter 2). 
   As Piore (1989) points out, this reduction of in-process inventory has an important effect 
on the relationship among work stations: it forces fundamental changes on the way workers 
relate to each other, from isolated, independent operations to intense interaction between ad-
jacent operations. That is, it drastically increases opportunities for productive interactions 
among workers. This change increases the threshold level of the correlation coefficient in my 
model, from p** to p*, because of the possibility of the negative production externalities un-
der relative performance evaluation: induced cooperation is now more likely to be preferred. 
Delegated cooperation is then also more likely to be optimal. This is then consistent with ca-
 22 Itoh (1991b) also applies the results to the analysis of human resource management prac-
tices of the stylized Japanese firm. 
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sual observation that the elimination of in-process inventory is accompanied by the changes in 
work organizational practices uch as greater lateral communication and intensive job rotations 
within work teams. These practices create joint responsibility of workers to multiple tasks, 
as in induced cooperation, and facilitate mutual monitoring and sanctioning, as in delegated 
cooperation. 
   The discussion given above is still speculative, and more systematic tests of the results of 
the paper are high in my agenda.
21
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                         Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 1. 
   I first formally state the general optimization problem the principal solves as follows: 
2 
             max µi(ai, bi) - CA(a) - CB (b) - 2 rAaEce - 2 rBOEO (la) 
                        a,b,c 3                            i
=1 
subject to 
               2 2 
             aiµi(ai, bi) - CA(a) > Eaipi(a',bi) - CA (a) for all a, (1b) 
                 i-1 i=1 
and 
               2 2 
             Oiµi(ai, bi) - CB(b) > Oil-ti(ai, bi) - CB(b`) for all b', (lc) 
                  i=1 i=1 
where the risk premium terms are given by 
                    aEa = a1 a1 + a2 ~2 + 2a1 a2 pa10'2 (2a) 
and 
                     OE, 3= 01 a1 + 02 a2 +20,02 po1 a2 . (2b) 
(1b) and (lc) are the incentive compatibility constraints stating that (a, b) is a Nash equilib-
rium. 
   Because of the assumption ofno correlation (p = 0), it is sufficient to consider share rates 
that are nonnegative. Then the first-order conditions for (lb) and (lc) are given as follows: 
                ai{aiµ2(ai + bi) - cAi(ai)} = 0 for i = 1, 2; (3a) 
                bi{0iµi(ai + bi) - c (bi)} = 0 for i = 1, 2. (3b) 
These constraints incorporate the constraints ai > 0 and bi > 0 into the local incentive 
compatibility constraints. (See Itoh (1991) for the detail.) The principal solves (la) with 
ui (ai, bi) = ft i(ai + bi) and p = 0 subject o (3a) and (3b). Let 'yi > 0 and i > 0 be the 
Lagrange multipliers for (3a) and (3b), respectively. 
   Suppose that one agent, say agent B, is solely responsible to one of the tasks, say task 2 
(a2 = 0 and b2 > 0) at optimum. Then by the Kuhn-Tucker conditions, there exist •yi and i 
(i = 1, 2) such that 
               t2(b2) - CA2(a2) - y2CA2(a2) + S2b2fi2/-t2 (b2)~ 0 (4a) 
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and 
              µ2 (b2) - CB2 (b2) + e2 b2 [02 it (b2) - cB2 (b2 )] = 0. (4b) 
Solving (4b) for [2 and substituting into (4a) yield 
                c'B2(b2) + 6b2C82(b2) (1 + 72 )CA2(a2). (5) 
This inequality never holds for any nonnegative 72 and 2 under the assumptions of the 
proposition. (Note in particular cA2(a2) = 0.) Therefore, sole responsibility cannot be true 
for either task at optimum. 
   One only needs to show that both agents select positive efforts at both tasks: a1 = b1 = 0, 
for example, cannot hold at optimum. This can be easily shown by the procedure similar to 
that presented above.
Proof of Proposition 2. 
   By the simplifying assumptions of the proposition, one can decompose the optimization 
problem to one for agent A and one for agent B. Here I focus on the optimization problem for 
agent A, which is given as follows: 
                    max a1 + a2 - CA1(al) - CA2 (a2) - 2rAca (6a) 
                                        a,a 
subject o 
                          a1 - cA1(a1) =0 (6b) 
and 
                              a2 - CA2(a2) = 0. (6c) 
By solving the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the program, one can easily obtain the following 
solution: 
                      a1 = D-1(1 + rAQ2(mA2 - PmA1)); (7a) 
                     a2 = D-1(1 + rAa1(mAI - PmA2 )) (7b) 
where D 1 rA(cr1 c'A1 + ~2 CA2) + rA(1 - P2 )a1 012 C'A1 CA2 > 0. Under the assumption 
mA2 > mA1, a1 is always strictly positive, regardless of the correlation coefficient. Also a2 is 
always strictly positive if 
                1+ rAQ1(mAI - PmA2) >_ 1 + rAal (mAI - mA2) > 0 
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Ior mA2 - mA1 < (rAo1)-1. Otherwise, define p* by 
                       P* = 1 + rAcTl --'Al (8)                                           11 11 
                                     2 rAU1072CA2 mA2                                rAQ1 cJ2CA
Then a2 > 0 if and only if p < p*. 
Proof of Proposition 3. 
   This follows directly from (8). 
Proof of Proposition 4. 
   I first state the principal's problem for agent A when µ1 = a1 and µ2 = b2 as follows: 
                           max a1 - cA1(a1) - 2 rAaEa (9a) 
                                                 a1,a 
subject o 
                             a1 - cA1(a1) =0. (9b) 
The solution to this program yields the optimal shares given in (*) in the main text. 
   We know that by Proposition 1, induced cooperation is better than relative performance 
evaluation when p = 0. On the other hand, when p = 1, the optimal share rates under elative 
performance evaluation are given by a1 = 1 and a2 = -pal /a2. Substituting these into 
the risk premium term (2a) yields aEa = 0. That is, the first-best is attained, and hence 
relative performance evaluation is better. What remains to be shown is that the net payoff 
is decreasing in p under induced cooperation and increasing in p under relative performance 
evaluation. 
   Let IA(p) = (a(p), a(p)) be the optimal incentive scheme for agent A under the correlation 
coefficient p and P(IA(p); p) be the total payoff from agent A's actions. The higher P is, the 
higher the net payoff to the principal is. 
   First consider induced cooperation. IA(p) then is the solution to program (6a-6c) with 
a1 > 0 and a2 > 0, and P(IA(p); p) is the total payoff (6a). We then want to show 
P(IA(p"); p") < P(IA(p'); p') for p" > p'. To show this, note that p affects only the risk 
premium term in (6a). I(p") hence satisfies (6b-6c) regardless of correlation, and is fea-
sible under the program with p = p'. However, if P(IA(p"); p") > P(IA(p'); p'), then 
P(IA(p"); p') > P(IA(p"); p") holds. By transitivity, the net payoff with correlation p' is 
higher under IA(p") than under IA(p'). Contradiction. The net payoff to the principal is 
therefore decreasing in the correlation under induced cooperation. 
   Under elative performance evaluation without sabotage, IA(p) is the optimal scheme to 
program (9a-9b) which satisfies a1a2 < 0 for p > 0. Then if P(IA(p"); p") < P(IA(P'); P') 
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hold for p".p', then P(IA(p'); p') < P(IA(p'); p") holds. Since IA(p') is feasible under program 
with p = p", this contradicts he optimality of IA(p"). We thus have the net payoff increasing 
in the correlation under relative performance evaluation. 
    Finally, p** < p* is immediate since the net payoff under relative performance without 
sabotage isstrictly higher that with sabotage. 
Proof of Proposition 5. 
   It is obvious from the discussion after the proposition. 
Proof of Proposition 6. 
   In general, when agents ide trade based on their actions, the principal solves the following 
program: (1a) subject o 
2 
           (a, b) E arg max{~(ai + ~i)µi(a2, b') - CA (a') - CB (b')} (10a) 
                                     a',b'                            i=1
and 
              (a,/3) E arg min{rAa'Fa' + rB/3'F,/3'; a  +, 3' = a + 0}. (10b) 
                                            a10 
(10a) states that the agents select a Pareto optimal effort pair. (10b) states that the contract 
prevents the agents from reinsuring between them. 
   Suppose µ1(a1, b1) = µ1(a1) and µ2 (a2, b2) = [12(b2)- I first show that the principal enjoys 
delegated cooperation when p = 0. Suppose (a1, b2, a1, 02) is the optimal contract under no 
side trade. (Note a2 = b1 = a2 = /31 = 0 by independence.) They then satisfy 
                   a1 - cA1(a1) and P2 = cB2(b2). (11) 
                      µ1(a1) /22(b2) 
Consider the following program: 
2 
                  min EJ(rA(a')2 + rB(N1)2)a2} (12a) 
        a''6'                                                a=1 
subject o 
                  a1 + X31 =a1 and a2 + /2 = /32. (12b) 
Let (a„ Q) be the solution to this program, which is given by (**) in the main text after 
the proposition. By (11) and (12b), the solution satisfies (10a), and hence the side trading 
agents elect (a1, b2) under In addition, it is obvious that (&,,3) satisfies (10b) when 
p = 0. Therefore (&,/) is the optimal scheme implementing (a1, b2) under side trading, and 
is preferred to (a1„ Q2) by the principal because it attains lower isk premiums than (al,/32)-
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   When p = 1, relative performance evaluation under no side trade is preferred because 
it attains the first-best outcome as shown in the proof of Proposition 4. The latter proof 
also shows that the net payoff to the principal is increasing in p under relative performance 
evaluation. The argument similar to that in the proof of Proposition 4 also applies to show 
that the net payoff is decreasing in p under side trading. The existence of the threshold value 
thus follows.
Proof of Proposition 7. 
Claim (a). When the agents ide trade based on their actions, the set of feasible fforts the 
principal can implement contains only those fforts which satisfy (#): 
    Under the assumptions, the side trading agents select their efforts by 
2 
                 abx {(ai + /i)(ai + bi) - cAi(ai) - cBi(bi)}. (13) 
                                      a=1 
The first-order conditions thus yield ai + /3i = c'Ai(ai) = c.'Bi (bi) for i = 1, 2. 
Claim (b). If the principal wishes to implement efforts atisfying (#), then she attains dele-
gated cooperation: 
    Let (a, b, a, /3) be the optimal contract under no side trade and suppose for i = 1, 2, 
cAi (ai) = c'Bi (bi ). Then by the incentive compatibility constraints, ai = /i for i = 1, 2. Let 
(a, /3) 'be the solution to the following program: 
                          min rAa'Ea' + rB/3'E/3' (14a) 
subject to 
                             a/ )3. (14b) 
Then clearly side trading agents select (a, b) under (a, /3). Furthermore, they have no incentive 
to reinsure themselves, and hence (a, /3) satisfies (10b). Finally, the risk premiums are lower 
under (a, /3) than under (a, /3) because 
        rAaEa + rB/3E/3 <min rAa'Ea' + rB/3'E/3' subject to a' +,3' = a + /3 
                    <rAaEa + rB/3E/3 
where the first inequality follows because by assumption, induced cooperation is optimal in 
the case of no side trade, and hence a +,3 > a = /3. 
Claim (c). When o side trade occurs, the optimal efforts for the principal satisfy (#) if and 
only if rAC'Ai = rBCBi for i = 1, 2: 
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   Given the total effort for task i, denoted by ti, the principal solves the following program 
when agents do not side trade: 
2 
             min E{cAi(ai) + cBi(ti - ai)} + 2rAaEa +2rB~3E/3 (15a) 
                               a,a,Q                            i
-1 
subject o 
                        ai - cAi(ai) = 0 for i = 1,2 (15b) 
and 
                        ~i-c'Bi(ti-ai)=0 fori=1,2. (15c) 
Let Ti and ~i be the Lagrange multipliers for (15b) and (15c), respectively. Then the Kuhn-
Tucker necessary and sufficient conditions yield the following: 
               CIAi - CI Bi + yicAi - ~icBi .= 0 for i = 1, 2; (16a) 
                 rAaiaZ + rAajpala2 = yi for i, j = 1,2 and j i; (16b) 
                 rBIia2 + T0jpa1 cr2 = ~i for i, j = 1, 2 and j i. (16c) 
By (15b-15c) and (16a-16c), we obtain 
C c' -}- r c" U2 c' -{- c' r c" Q2 c' -}- c' ) = 0 for ij = 1 2 and j ~ i.  Ai - Bi A Ai( i Ai P 1 2 Aj) - B Bi( i Bi POI 2 Bj > >
                                                 (17)
The conclusion follows from (17). 
   From Claims (a)-(c), the conclusion f the proposition follows. 
Proof of Proposition 8 
   By the symmetry of the agents and the technological ndependence, th  optimal efforts 
satisfy a1 = b2. Then a1 + 131 =a2 + 02 holds at optimum. Since the agents have the same 
coefficient of absolute risk aversion, they share risk equally, i.e., ai = /3j for i = 1, 2, and 
hence a1 = a2 and 131 =02. This implies that although individual performance m asures are 
available, the optimal pay schemes depend only on the team performance, when the agents 
side trade.
29
